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Stuart Hall and the theory and 
practice of articulation 
 
 
John Clarke∗ 
Faculty of Social Sciences, The Open University, UK 
 
In this article, I argue that the idea of articulation links three different dimensions of 
Stuart Hall’s work:  it is central to the work of cultural politics, to the work of 
hegemony, and to his practice of embodied pedagogy. I claim that his approach to 
pedagogy entails the art of listening combined with the practice of theorising in the 
service of expanding who belongs to the public. This involves the work of 
translation, finding ways of addressing different audiences.  I treat each of these 
aspects in turn, drawing out the salience of articulation for each and suggest that 
these three dimensions are themselves articulated by Hall’s commitment to the theory 
and practice of articulation. 
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When reading or listening to the many comments and commentaries on Stuart Hall’s 
life and work that followed his death in February 2014, I was moved by how many 
paid tribute to his personal charm, his generosity in thinking and talking with others, 
as well as his engaging and persuasive way of speaking.1  In this brief article, I will 
make speculative connections between these apparently personal characteristics and 
his orientations to theory, politics and pedagogy.2 In this, I do not mean to suggest 
that the descriptions of his grace, generosity, or compelling style of thinking and 
speaking are trivial, incidental, or even wrong-headed. On the contrary, they 
consistently convey qualities that seem all too rare in the worlds of the academy and 
politics.  The article asks what underlies this outpouring of tributes and their recurrent 
themes and offers an alternative reading of these ‘personal qualities’ and engaging 
style, explaining them as central to his embodied praxis of articulation. This paper 
will demonstrate how the concept of articulation works in three different and yet 
inter-related ways to organise his political, pedagogic and intellectual projects—as the 
work of cultural politics, the work of securing hegemony, and the attentive listening 
necessary to the work of embodied pedagogy. 
 
 
Turning to articulation 
 
This paper will argue that Hall’s engaging ways were more than merely personal, yet 
nor were they the result of the sort of careful calculation expressed in the 
contemporary academic obsessions with public engagement or the maximization of 
‘impact’. Rather, they were the manifestations of a uniquely historically aware and 
forward-looking reflection about intellectual, political, and pedagogic work within 
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and beyond the academy. Hall’s many political projects and commitments embodied 
personal, political and pedagogical dimensions. They were part and parcel of his 
conduct throughout his varied and intertwined career as activist, theorist, public 
intellectual and academic, and, for me, linked his public practice to the more intimate 
relationships of mentor, collaborator, colleague, and friend No-one who spent any 
time with him was in any doubt about the sincerity of the warmth, interest and 
attention that were in play in such encounters.  
 It is not exactly news to claim that the concept of articulation was central to Stuart 
Hall’s work (see, for example, Slack, 1996). What is perhaps most striking is the 
multiple productive ways in which this idea worked for him: it linked his approach to 
thinking about social formations, his orientation to culture as the site of ideological 
and political struggles, and the problematic politics of constructing counter-
hegemonic possibilities in popular politics. The idea also linked his work on diasporic 
identities, popular cultural forms and aesthetic/cultural practices. In the following 
sections, I review some of these usages of articulation, before returning to the 
question of ‘practising articulation’. 
 The starting point is the role that articulation plays in Hall’s response to the 
problem of analysing social formations, even though this issue often disappears in 
accounts of articulation in the analysis of discourse, ideology and culture. It is, 
however, an important starting point because it locates articulation at the centre of his 
attempt to think about cultural studies in relation to Marxism and forms a critical 
hinge in his uses of Marx, Gramsci, and Althusser during the 1970s and 1980s. He 
followed Althusser in refusing the view of the base/superstructure distinction (and the 
internal relations of determination between the two parts) that had dominated much 
Marxist theorising, not least for the room this created for thinking about the relative 
autonomy of social instances—and for ‘culture’, in particular. The idea of articulation 
provided a means for addressing the complex character of social formations (as 
articulated unities) rather than simple, or expressive, totalities. This Althusserian view 
of social formations which combined multiple modes of production with economic, 
political, ideological levels or instances in an articulated combination that was 
‘structured in dominance’ rather than simply determined, coincided with Hall’s 
reading of critical parts of Marx, notably the 1857 Introduction to the Critique of 
Political Economy or Grundrisse (Hall, 2003; Marx, 1993). He was taken with 
Marx’s description of the circuit of capital as a complex totality, composed of 
different moments (productions, exchange, circulation, consumption, etc.) that 
together formed a ‘unity in difference’. 
 This understanding of social formations as articulated structures was paralleled in 
his understanding of articulation as central to work on ideology, domination and 
hegemony. Here Hall moved between an Althusserian concern with ideology (not 
least the question of interpellation) and a Gramscian focus on hegemony and the 
organization of consent (not least in the complex relations with the field of common 
sense). This engagement took place dialogically—not least through the conversations 
(in person and in writing) with Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s work on 
hegemony (e.g., Laclau & Mouffe, 1985).  In the development of articulation as an 
alternative to more reductive conceptions of ideology, we can see the characteristic 
subtlety of Hall’s mobile theorising: working with and against other ways of thinking 
in a complex negotiation: Althusser allows us to see X, but does not help us with Y. 
Or Foucault provides a way of approaching knowledge and power, yet does not give 
us Gramsci’s understanding of common sense … and so on. I suspect that Gramsci 
provided the closest thing to a fixed point for this mobility, not least for his attention 
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to the necessity of conjunctural analysis (see, for example, Hall, 1986; 1987).  But this 
mobile and exploratory understanding of theory—and of articulation in particular—is 
visible in statements like the following:  
 
By the term ‘articulation’, I mean a connection or link which is not necessarily given in all 
cases, as a law or a fact of life, but which requires particular conditions of existence to appear 
at all, which has to be positively sustained by specific processes, which is not ‘eternal’ but has 
to be constantly renewed, which can under some circumstances disappear or be overthrown, 
leading to the old linkages being dissolved and new connections—re-articulations—being 
forged. It is also important that an articulation between different practices does not mean that 
they become identical or that one is dissolved into the other. Each retains its distinct 
determinations and conditions of existence. However, once an articulation is made, the two 
practices can function together, not as an ‘immediate identity’ (in the language of Marx’s 
‘1857 Introduction’) but as distinctions within a ‘unity’. (Hall, 1985, pp. 113-114, footnote 2). 
 
Here we can see some of the characteristic formulations of articulation—in particular, 
the view that connections or links are not ‘necessarily given’ as a fact of life or by law 
like correspondences. Hall returned time and again to the importance of the ‘no 
necessary correspondence’ between elements—while simultaneously refusing the 
other pole of ‘necessarily no correspondence’—(1985, p. 94). Instead, he insisted on 
the importance of analysing the specifics of particular articulations. This meant 
paying attention to both the conditions of their existence and the political-cultural 
work (practice) that went into making and sustaining specific articulations. No 
articulation—whether the combination of social instances in a social formation or a 
discursive alignment of meanings and politics—came with a ‘lifetime guarantee’. 
Rather their internal organisation (involving potential disjunctures, contradictions, 
antagonisms and tensions) and their external conditions of existence created the 
possibility of ‘disarticulation and rearticulation’. This understanding of articulation—
combining both its contingency and the necessity of the work of production and 
maintenance—was a critical element in Hall’s approach to cultural studies and 
established the ground on which other implications of articulation as a way of naming 
the problems of politics and pedagogy could be developed. 
 
Articulation as the work of cultural politics 
  
This leads me to the second way in which the concept of articulation was important to 
Hall’s project for cultural studies—in resisting expressive or reductive conceptions of 
ideology (or culture or discourse) in which specific ideas or ways of thinking were 
identified with a particular class location. This was always one of the most 
contentious terrains for cultural studies, given the temptations to identify ideologies 
with particular classes or to think of cultures as coherent organic unities that 
condensed a whole way of life (of a class, or community) in an anthropological 
model. As Jennifer Slack (1996) argues, articulation is one of the means by which 
Stuart Hall  ‘resists the temptation of reduction to class, mode of production, 
structure, as well as to culturalism’s tendency to reduce culture to “experience”’ (pp. 
122–123).  
 In developing his work around the concept of articulation, Hall always 
emphasized a double meaning, in which the ideas of ‘to give voice to’ and ‘to 
connect’ are always implied and always co-present. In an interview with Larry 
Grossberg, Hall talked at some length about the concept and its significance for him, 
including these (much cited) observations: 
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I always use the word ‘articulation’, though I don’t know whether the meaning I attribute to it 
is perfectly understood. In England, the term has a nice double meaning because ‘articulate’ 
means to utter, to speak forth, to be articulate. It carries that sense of language-ing, of 
expressing, etc. But we also speak of an ‘articulated’ lorry (truck): a lorry where the front 
(cab) and back (trailer) can, but need not necessarily, be connected to one another. The two 
parts are connected to each other, but through a specific linkage, that can be broken. An 
articulation is thus the form of the connection that can make a unity of two different elements, 
under certain conditions. It is a linkage which is not necessary, determined, absolute and 
essential for all time. You have to ask, under what circumstances can a connection be forged 
or made? So the so-called ‘unity’ of a discourse is really the articulation of different, distinct 
elements which can be rearticulated in different ways because they have no necessary 
‘belongingness’. The ‘unity’ which matters is a linkage between that articulated discourse and 
the social forces with which it can, under certain historical conditions, but need not 
necessarily, be connected. Thus, a theory of articulation is both a way of understanding how 
ideological elements come, under certain conditions, to cohere together within a discourse, 
and a way of asking how they do or do not become articulated, at specific conjunctures, to 
certain political subjects. Let me put that the other way: the theory of articulation asks how an 
ideology discovers its subject rather than how the subject thinks the necessary and inevitable 
thoughts which belong to it; it enables us to think how an ideology empowers people, enabling 
them to begin to make some sense or intelligibility of their historical situation, without 
reducing those forms of intelligibility to their socio-economic or class location or social 
position. (Grossberg, 1996, pp. 142–143) 
 
The ‘articulated lorry’ metaphor is often taken up in terms of how different elements 
are articulated in a discursive or ideological formation, in which the elements have no 
necessary belonging—it is the way in which they are assembled together, the forging 
of specific links and connections that gives them their social, cultural or political 
force.3 But less clearly visible in this argument is a question of political articulation—
the ways in which an articulated discourse and a combination of social forces can 
(conjuncturally) be connected. It is the articulation of both a discourse and that 
discourse with ‘certain political subjects’ that constitutes the double movement of 
articulation. It is that second element that makes articulation more than a ‘merely 
cultural’ concept. 
 It is important to note that Hall’s reference to ‘social forces’ condenses a whole 
series of analytical questions. Although the concept and its relatives (balance of 
forces, political forces, etc.) are taken from an orthodox Marxist framing, the uses 
Hall makes of them always involve an insistence that social forces are never simply 
classes (as derivatives of the social relations of production). On the contrary, social 
forces for Hall were always multiple, constituted by the varieties of domination and 
subordination that were in play in any specific conjunctural setting. It is this argument 
that organises the conjunctural analysis offered in Policing the Crisis (Hall et al., 
1978 Not in references) in which the accumulating crises of the British social 
formation are understood as being articulated through ‘race’ (see also the elegant 
essay by Gail Lewis, 2000, in which she dissects the displacement of ‘race’ in British 
social policy). I have argued elsewhere (Clarke, forthcoming) that this conception of 
social forces was one of the (many) enabling roles that Gramsci’s work played in the 
development of cultural studies. Gramsci’s tendency, in The Prison Notebooks 
(1973), to write cryptically and elusively about ‘social groups’ combined with his 
concern with hegemony as the site of alliances and blocs to blur the classical 
simplicities of class relations of domination and subordination.  
 
 
	 	 5 
Articulation as the work of hegemony 
 
His interest in the work of hegemony stressed articulation as a practice in the double 
sense that I have described above.  At the core of this was an understanding of 
hegemony as the (contingent and conditional) construction of popular consent to the 
project and programme of a ‘ruling bloc’. Again following Gramsci, Hall insisted on 
the importance of understanding this as a bloc—an alliance of class fractions and 
other social groups, that aimed to provide social leadership—a project that could 
shape the direction of the social formation. Here is the first moment of 
connection/articulation—the construction of the (would be) ruling bloc among 
potentially competing and conflicting interests (including among the capitalist class 
itself).4 The second moment consists of the work of articulating the subordinate (or 
subaltern) groups through material and symbolic concessions in which they are ‘taken 
account of’ in such ways that they can come to identify themselves in the leading 
project. 
 This includes the elaboration of ways of addressing, appropriating themes 
attached to, and speaking for subordinate social groups. This included—a central 
theme for cultural studies—borrowing and bending the forms and styles of popular 
thought. Here is posed the relationship between hegemony and common sense. For 
Hall, this was where cultural studies connected most powerfully with Gramsci’s 
understanding of the relationship between hegemony and commonsense. In Gramsci’s 
view, we are always—  
 
… the product of the historical process to date which has deposited in you an infinity of traces 
without leaving an inventory … Moreover, commonsense is a collective noun, like religion: 
there is not just one common sense, for that too is a product of history and a part of the 
historical process. (1973, pp. 324–325).  
 
This insistence on the fragmentary and heterogeneous formation of commonsense 
identifies the work of political articulation that is required to articulate selected 
elements or fragments of commonsense with dominant conceptions to create the 
appearance of a shared, unitary and coherent understanding of the world. It is 
important to emphasise the ‘selected elements’, since there are many ‘common 
senses’ and some of them, as Gramsci argued, contain ‘good sense’ that might be 
mobilised to build alternative hegemonies. For example, the Right—in Britain, the 
USA, and elsewhere—has often borrowed common sense discourses of nation, work 
and family to articulate a national-popular project. But they have also borrowed (and 
bent) apparently more egalitarian fragments of commonsense, as in the recent uses 
made of ‘fairness’ as a popular British identification by the Conservative-led 
Coalition government. In this, ‘fairness’ is re-articulated to legitimate welfare cuts (in 
benefits and services) in the defence of being ‘fair’ to ‘hard working families’ 
(Clarke, 2014). Writing in the 1980s, Hall argued for recognising Gramsci’s 
importance for engaging with politics as an articulatory practice: 
 
Since, in fact, the political character of our ideas cannot be guaranteed by our class position or 
by the ‘mode of production’, it is possible for the Right to construct a politics which does 
speak to people’s experience, which does insert itself into what Gramsci called the necessarily 
fragmentary, contradictory nature of common sense, which does resonate with some of their 
ordinary aspirations, and which, in certain circumstances, can recoup them as subordinate 
subjects, into a historical project which ‘hegemonises’ what we used—erroneously—to think 
of as their ‘necessary class interests’. Gramsci is one of the first modern Marxists to recognise 
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that interests are not given but have to be politically and ideologically constructed. (1987, p. 
20) 
 
This practice of articulation was, for Hall, a complex one, implying political work: 
selective work vis à vis the many common senses, involving both the selective 
mobilisation of some aspects and the obverse: the selective demobilisation of other 
elements by rendering them silent, ridiculous, unrealistic, out of time or place and so 
on. As Slack and Wise (2007) insist, this view of articulation as a practice is closely 
tied to Hall’s understanding of cultural studies as a contextual and conjunctural way 
of working: 
 
These articulations are not fixed for all time; they do not remain permanently in place. They 
can and do change over time. But, here too, the speed and direction of change is contingent. 
Some articulations remain relatively tenacious; they are rather firmly forged and difficult to 
disarticulate. Hall called these ‘lines of tendential force’, which draws attention to their 
tendency to remain articulated. Others, however, might be more easily broken and thus subject 
to disarticulation. It all depends on the particulars of the nature of the articulations at any 
particular historical moment. (p. 128) 
 
This view of articulation then underpins a reading of hegemony as not just as 
something to be established and maintained, a conception which implies a view of 
cultural studies as critique (widely held and practised) but also a concern with how to 
conduct alternative politics. This is the condition for his famous observation that 
popular culture is—  
 
… one of the places where socialism might be constituted. That is why ‘popular culture’ 
matters. Otherwise, to tell you the truth, I don’t give a damn about it. (Hall, 1989, p. 239)  
 
In this sense culture constituted a field of possibility in which relations of domination 
and subordination were inscribed, represented, refused and contested through 
articulatory practices. A critical part of his frustration at much of British (and beyond) 
left politics was about the failure to take this field of possibility seriously (see The 
Hard Road to Renewal, 1989, for example).  Some of this concerned the lack of 
attention to the work of hegemony being performed in Thatcherism (and subsequent 
British versions of what he later called ‘commonsense neoliberalism’, Hall and 
O’Shea, 2013), but much of his frustration focused on the left’s failure to think about 
the other threads of common sense and how they might be worked with and on to 
create progressive blocs that spoke with and for the subordinated, marginalised and 
excluded. Such a view of articulation implies paying attention to common sense, its 
multiplicity, its fractures, the desires it voices, the silences it contains, and more. 
Listening and paying attention is hard work, while short cuts are easy and attractive—
if not necessarily politically effective. This issue preoccupied him through to his last 
writings, for example, the essays on neoliberalism in Soundings (Ref?) and Cultural 
Studies (Ref?). 
 
 
Articulation as embodied pedagogy 
 
This understanding of articulation as a practice also underpinned Hall’s approach to 
pedagogy. By pedagogy, I mean to refer to the many varieties of teaching in which he 
engaged: lectures, classes, workshops, and the vast amount of individual and 
collective teaching material he produced while at the Open University between 1978 
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and 1997. The OU is a distance teaching university and he contributed to the making 
of a variety of courses in the form of TV programmes and DVDs, audio 
commentaries, editing and authoring written materials and more. The university also 
operates a model of the ‘collective teacher’: the course or module team that is 
responsible for preparing such teaching materials and Hall’s presence in such 
processes was a powerful one: leading, enabling, supporting and developing, but 
always with a view to finding the right modes of address and engagement between the 
course and its students. He also took an active role in the week long summer schools 
that the University ran, and was a remarkable presence in the everyday tutoring, in the 
one–off evening lectures given by all members of staff, but—most of all—in the 
amount of time he would give to talking with students in groups and individually 
about their studies, their lives and the world in which they lived. Having seen him in 
these settings, I can only say that the gracious generosity for which he was well-
known was constantly visible (and was a constant source of delight for students)—and 
these qualities were matched by a seemingly boundless capacity to enter, continue and 
renew such conversations. 
 But this is not just a question of being nice: it reflects an orientation to pedagogy 
as articulation that runs throughout his work. The somewhat banal pedagogical 
principle of ‘starting where the student is’ takes on a rather different political and 
cultural significance in this light. Of course, ‘where the student is’—from a cultural 
studies perspective—is rarely simple, singular or straightforward. On the contrary, 
‘the student’ embodied all those things that Hall knew to be true about identities, 
common senses and the practice of articulation. Identities are multiple and rarely 
fixed; common senses are heterogeneous and fragmentary and the work of articulation 
is to build connections that lead towards a set of new configurations and possibilities. 
Angela McRobbie (2000) has argued for the importance of viewing him as a teacher 
in contextually specific ways: 
 
Two things about Stuart Hall’s career as a teacher as well as an intellectual are significant. 
First, his practice as a teacher has at every point departed from the university tradition 
embodied in the Oxbridge model. Second, in the British post-1945 context where the agenda 
for public intellectual debate remains firmly set by the standards and concerns of Oxbridge, 
and symbolized by the role of the BBC, Hall’s field of influence is less in the establishment 
channels of the quality press and the portals of government, and more in the lecture theatres 
and seminar rooms of the redbrick and new universities, and, of course, in the late night 
broadcasts of the Open University. Stuart Hall has operated throughout his career as a teacher, 
and indeed as a certain kind of teacher. As he himself said in interview, ‘Open university 
courses are open to those who don’t have any academic background. If you are going to make 
cultural studies ideas live with them, you have to translate the ideas, be willing to write at that 
more popular and accessible level. I wanted cultural studies to be open to that sort of 
challenge. I didn’t see why it wouldn’t ‘live’ as a more popular pedagogy’. (Hall, quoted in 
McRobbie, 2000, p. 212) 
 
This establishes a view of pedagogy as an engagement, a conversation, and a process 
of collective discovery, rather than an act of masterly revelation. That implies hard 
work too and it inverts what has (too) often been a left or progressive view of the 
relationship between politics and pedagogy: that teaching is the site for doing or—
more frequently—announcing politics. In this mode, the act of revealing truth tears 
aside the veil of ideology and allows people to see clearly (as if they had become 
Johnny Nash). This was not a model of politics or pedagogy (or ideology) that Hall 
thought was sustainable or productive. Nor did he think that critical work was about 
the deconstruction of common sense (in which common sense was intrinsically 
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erroneous or false—bad thinking), which could be simply countered or displaced by 
correct knowledge. Certainly he thought teaching was the site of politics (just like 
popular culture), but that telling people what was right or true in a loud voice was 
unlikely to be an effective form of political mobilization. 
 
I do think it is a requirement of intellectuals to speak a kind of truth. Maybe not truth with a 
capital T, but anyway, some kind of truth, the best truth that they know or can discover—to 
speak that truth to power. To take responsibility—which can be unpleasant and is no recipe for 
success—for having spoken it. To take responsibility for speaking it to wider groups of people 
than are simply involved in the professional life of ideas. To speak it beyond the confines of 
the academy. To speak it, however, in its full complexity. Never to speak it in too simple a 
way, because ‘the folks won’t understand’. Because then they will understand, but they will 
get it wrong, which is much worse! So, to speak it in its full complexity, but to try to speak it 
in terms in which other people who, after all, can think and do have ideas in their heads, 
though they are not paid or paid-up intellectuals, need it. (Hall, 2007, p. ?)  
 
This conception of ‘how to speak’ is a powerful one, expressing a responsibility to 
engage with the audiences or publics who ‘need to know’ in the appropriate terms.  
Such a view meant that teaching was necessarily an exercise in articulation in a 
heteroglossic context, such that ‘starting where the student is’ meant considering the 
array of voices and modes of thinking that might be encountered and might provide 
the point of departure for the work of ‘thinking again’. Cultural and political contexts 
were necessarily heteroglossic (in Bakhtin’s sense) and required attention to the 
shifting terrains of the popular and the varieties of common sense that were in play at 
any particular moment. Pedagogy meant the task of working with, and on, those 
varieties—seeking to articulate them into new possibilities, new alignments and new 
directions of travel. Hall’s willingness to undertake this work of articulation was 
echoed, perhaps, in his ways of thinking and theorising such that teaching was not a 
separate domain. James Procter in his book on Stuart suggests that his practice of 
‘doing theory’ can itself be understood as a practice of articulation: 
 
Articulation, as a theoretical practice in Hall’s writing, involves linking two or more different 
theoretical frameworks in order to move beyond the limits of either framework on its own. For 
example, at the centre of this chapter has been a discussion of Hall’s displacement of the early 
theoretical assumptions of ‘culturalism’ through an encounter with the more recent 
‘structuralisms’. Within Hall’s writings this displacement does not involve rejecting the 
former in order to proceed to the latter, but a coupling or articulation of the two in order to 
propose an alternative theoretical direction. This process of linkage is not fixed or final .… 
Articulations can only be made under a specific set of circumstances or, to adapt one final 
theoretical concept used by Hall, at a particular historical conjuncture. Hall’s theorising is 
conjunctural in the sense that it is always informed by and articulated as a response to, events 
at a particular moment. (Procter, 2004, p. 54) 
 
This is an interesting and suggestive view of Hall’s theorizing: evoking Hall as 
‘bricoleur’ discovering necessary elements in many different places and seeing what 
might happen if they were put together to illuminate pressing analytical and political 
issues. It certainly captures something of the mobile and unfinished way in which he 
would work patiently with, on and against, particular theorists or parts of their work. 
There are many examples of this—for instance, the essays on Gramsci (1986, 1987) 
or Althusser (1985). During the essay on Althusser, he carefully distinguishes that 
which he hopes to rescue and take up from Althusser’s work, whilst rejecting what he 
sees as overly structuralist tendencies. This approach underpins his response to E.P. 
Thompson’s (1978) famous critique of Althusser in The Poverty of Theory. He argues 
that Thompson provides an ‘undialectical reading’ of Althusser which lists the errors 
	 	 9 
and problems, yet ‘fails to recognize, at the same time, what real advances were being 
generated by Althusser’s work’ which establish ‘a threshold behind which we cannot 
allow ourselves to fall’ (1985, pp. 96–97).  Here, too, is a characteristic double 
movement: the careful engagement with the analytical resources being developed by 
others combined with the identification of ‘thresholds’ or ‘springboards’ that would 
enable forward movement—to enable the task of thinking again and thinking better. 
He once argued that he tended to favour the ‘middle period’ of writers:  
 
Perhaps I ought to say in parenthesis that I do find an alarming tendency in myself to prefer 
people’s less complete works to their later, mature and complete ones. I prefer The Eighteenth 
Brumaire to book II of Capital. I prefer Althusser’s For Marx  to Reading Capital. I like 
people’s middle period a lot, where they have gotten over their adolescent idealism but their 
thought has not yet hardened into a system. And I like Laclau when he’s struggling to find a 
way out of reductionism and beginning to reconceptualize marxist categories in the discursive 
mode. (Hall, quoted in Grossberg, 1996, p. 146) 
 
Here one might detect his own disposition to thinking and theorizing as active 
processes (and his reluctance to ‘Do Theory’ on a grand and abstracted scale). This 
orientation to thinking makes so much of his writing feel like ‘teaching’ in the best 
sense. In many places, he displays—in the sense of making visible—the process of 
working through ideas, concepts, orientations. What we read—or what we hear (since 
many of his essays began life as talks)—is the process of thinking, rather than just the 
conclusions. They are, then, also invitations to think with (and against) both Hall and 
the people with whom he is engaged. It establishes an exemplary practice of how to 
talk or write about thinking (as opposed to ‘undialectical’ critique). I was taken by the 
efforts of Gregor McLennan to capture this sensibility and style of Stuart Hall in a 
piece written shortly after his death. He begins from a troubling question—how to 
explain to others: 
 
What was it about Stuart Hall, as a social scientist, that was so special? 
 
To answer this, I find myself reaching for a rather old-fashioned, almost absurdly abstract 
term: dialectics. Yet for me this gets us close to the essence of Hall’s appeal as a thinker, 
teacher, mentor and friend. In so many people, in so many texts, and in so many addresses, 
seemingly contrary inclinations, arguments, traditions, political positions, and personal 
attributes jostle around awkwardly, never quite gelling into a final synthesis. But this was 
exactly the ‘dialectical’ quality and achievement of Stuart Hall’s work—especially when 
articulated in person. 
 Indeed, if dialectics comes across as abstract, this is because it is usually considered only 
at the level of pure understanding: the synthesis of generalised positions, theories, findings, 
and so on. Yet Hall had the rare gift and intelligence of expressing the dialectical movement of 
ideas and politics in his very character and presence. This was the way he worked with people, 
talked to (diverse) audiences, disputed and laughed his way through issues, and wrote up his 
(provisional, inclusive) solutions. 
 Only in recent times have sociologists (re)discovered the significance of ‘embodiment’ 
and ‘affect’, and only even more recently have fans of these new ‘vitalist’ notions realised that 
they are not in fact necessarily opposed to old ‘dry’ notions like reason, knowledge and 
argumentation. Better to put it, again, more dialectically: ideas and politics don’t lose their 
generality when they are ‘fused’ in and by particular situations and people, but they do seem 
to matter more because of this, gaining enhanced significance and buzz. And no one exuded 
this kind of embodied synthesizing intellectuality quite like Hall. (McLennan, 2014) 
 
This is a wonderful evocation and analysis that grasps the sense of a person as an 
embodied practice. This was, indeed ‘the way he worked with people’ and McLennan 
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captures the sensibility of pedagogy as articulation that I have been trying to 
address—but even then, I think there is one more element that needs to be added. 
 
Articulation as the work of attention 
 
The practice of articulation is not only the work of engaging, addressing, connecting. 
In a complex and heteroglossic context, crowded by many common senses, it also 
requires the work of listening: paying attention to what circulates, to what matters, to 
what connections are already being forged, what threads are being forgotten, and what 
apparently natural and normal alignments of things are coming apart. This is, in part, 
the work of cultural studies as Hall envisaged it: the search for the past, present and 
future possible articulations that secured and might unlock relations of domination 
and subordination. How is domination secured? How is hegemony articulated? What 
are the conjunctural conditions under which hegemony is fragile, vulnerable to the 
loss of consent?  
 Hall’s legacy involves both such questions and the commitment to doing the 
careful work of listening that can make such links and potential new alignments 
available to us. Hall practised what Les Back (2007) has called ‘the art of listening’: 
the dialogical capacity to hear what people are saying. Such an orientation refuses the 
more conventional monological mode of politics (and teaching, one might suggest) 
and opens the space of possibility for discovery. This is, as Back himself has argued, 
something other than the ‘we’re listening’ mode adopted by political parties (New 
Labour’s ‘Big Conversation’ for instance), government agencies or the marketing 
arms of corporations that seek our responses to their provisions. But only by listening 
was Hall able to find the links and the connections that might be built upon to enable 
a conversation that moved. That attention was both large scale (the moving terrain of 
British popular culture in all its transnational formations) and intimate (the immediate 
encounter always felt as though it mattered).  As a result, he was able to map the 
possibilities—a mapping that always enabled him to speak compellingly, making 
those connections, forging those links and refiguring the field of possibilities—again 
on a range of scales. 
 What so many of us remember is the voice—impassioned, warm, probing, 
inquisitive, laughing, and always generous in its offerings. Many of the tributes to him 
have evoked that experience. For example, Les Back (2014) observed that:  
 
Listening to Stuart Hall made us see the world differently and he had a gift that enabled us to 
understand our life anew.  He seemed to be talking directly to you, even if it was through the 
TV screen or through the pages of one of his many influential essays.  
 
A similar view is offered in Nirmal Puwar’s commentary about ‘meeting Stuart Hall’s 
voice’ (2014)—an image that grasps at the life in (and of) that voice. She recalls 
having first encountered him speaking in the early hours of the morning (on BBC 
transmitted Open University programmes) and goes on: 
 
  There were many other occasions when I met Stuart Hall. Of course we meet him when we 
read, teach and debate his vast scholarship. To meet him as a reader is to find a form of speech 
which is always directly addressing you. 
  One of the many reasons he will be missed is the highlight of hearing him present a talk. He 
slowly comes alive. The audience comes alive. The ideas build up to a crescendo. He offers ideas 
which set off a whirlpool of connections. He moves the room. His analysis sets forth a sociological 
imagination that shifts its cadence through the tension of connecting the micro to the macro, the 
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everyday to the abstract, from theory to everyday practices, and never without attention to the 
political moment. (Puwar, 2014) 
 
This, I want to suggest, is the embodied practice of articulation: the work of forging 
new connections in the pursuit of building progressive orientations and progressive 
alliances. In conclusion, I want to emphasise this as a practice for two reasons. The 
first is about not fetishizing the ‘Stuartness’ of Stuart Hall: what he did—and the way 
that did it—are models of good practice (the practice of articulation) rather than just 
the unfathomable wonders of a unique figure. I say this despite my profound 
admiration for who he was and how he conducted himself. We might nevertheless 
learn lessons—about listening and its value, about developing engaging (rather than 
instructive) modes of address and about finding ways of working in and with 
heteroglossic contexts in which multiple varieties of commonsense circulate. It is also 
the mode in which the personal and the political were articulated in Stuart Hall—a 
mode which we might strive to enact ourselves.  
 My second reason concerns the sense of loss that so many of us feel following 
Stuart’s death. On several occasions I have heard this manifest itself in the question 
‘what would Stuart have said about …?’ I think that misses the point: far better to ask 
‘how would Stuart have thought about this?’ This question would bring us to the work 
of articulation—to think in ways that are committed but open, that recognise the 
unfinished nature of the moment, that try to borrow and bend productive intellectual 
resources, and that take seriously the collective and collaborative nature of social (and 
political) life. For me, that is the greatest legacy: that articulation is not just a theory 
or an analytic orientation, but that—as embodied by Stuart Hall—it was also a 
pedagogic and political practice. 
 
                                                
Notes 
 
1 I am very grateful to the editors for the invitation to contribute to this special issue and to the 
anonymous reviewer and Leslie Roman for their thoughtful and constructive suggestions on the first 
draft. 
2 It is hard to write in the aftermath of Stuart’s death, not least because of the suspicion that he would 
never have taken himself this seriously. One specific instance of this difficulty concerns the problem 
of nomenclature—should he be interpellated as Stuart Hall, Stuart, Hall, or SH in the context of 
academic convention? This question remains unresolved—at least for me. 
3 I must confess to finding the ‘articulated lorry’ illustration somewhat frustrating. Articulated lorries 
articulate as a design feature—the cab and trailer are built with parts that are intended to conjoin. As 
a result, this may underestimate the work that articulation requires—whether in the ill-fitting 
alignments of economies and cultures in capitalist social formations, or the bending of forms of 
commonsense into would-be hegemonic projects. If only the parts were pre-designed for self-
assembly … 
4 The rise of neo-liberalism as a critical concept seems to have largely buried the question of the 
capitalist class as a fractioned, fractious, competitive and conflictual entity that cannot be relied upon 
to know its own ‘interests’. In contrast, Nicos Poulantzas (1973) argued that the state had to serve as 
the means by which ‘general interest’ of the capitalist class could be organised, while also providing 
the means of disorganising the subordinate classes. 
References 
Back, L. (2007). The art of listening. Oxford: Berg. 
Back, L. (2014). ‘Stuart Hall—a bright star’, Open Democracy, 16 February 2014: 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/les-back/stuart-hall-bright-star 
Clarke, J. (2014). Imagined economies: Austerity and the moral economy of ‘fairness’. Topia, 30-
31(Fall 2013, Spring 2014), pages ?. 
	 	 12 
Clarke, J. (forthcoming). Conjunctures, crises and cultures: Valuing Stuart Hall. Focal: A Journal of 
Global and Historical Anthropology. DOI number? 
Gramsci, A. (1973). Selections from the prison notebooks (G. Nowell Smith, & Q. Hoare, Eds.). 
London: Lawrence and Wishart. 
Grossberg, L. (1966). On postmodernism and articulation: An interview with Stuart Hall.  Journal of 
Communication Inquiry.  In D. Morley, & K. Chen (Eds.) Stuart Hall: Critical dialogues in 
cultural studies, (pp. 131–150). London: Routledge.  
Hall, S. (1981 Where is this cited?). Notes on deconstructing ‘the popular’. In R. Samuel (Ed.), 
People’s history and socialist theory, (pp. 227–240). London: Routledge.  
Hall, S. (1985). Signification, representation, ideology: Althusser and the post-structuralist debate. 
Critical Studies in Mass Communication, 2(2), 91–114. 
Hall, S. (1986). Gramsci’s relevance for the study of race and ethnicity.  Journal of Communication 
Inquiry, 10(5), 5–27. 
Hall, S. (1987). Gramsci and us.  Marxism today, 16–21 June.  
Hall, S. (1989). The hard road to renewal. London: Verso. 
Hall, S. (2003). Marx’s notes on method: A ‘reading’ of the ‘1857 Introduction’. Cultural Studies, 
17(2), 113–149. 
Hall, S. (2007). Epilogue: Through the prism of an intellectual life. In B. Meeks (Ed.), Culture, politics, 
race and diaspora: The thought of Stuart Hall, (pp. 269–291). London: Lawrence and 
Wishart.  
Hall, S., & O’Shea, A. (2013). Common-sense neoliberalism. Soundings, 55, 9–25. 
Laclau, E., & Mouffe, C. (1985). Hegemony and socialist strategy: Towards a radical democratic 
politics.  London: Verso. 
Lewis, G. (2000). Stuart Hall and social policy: An encounter of strangers? In P. Gilroy, L. Grossberg, 
& A. McRobbie (Eds.), Without guarantees: In honour of Stuart Hall, (pp. 193–202). London: 
Verso. 
Marx, K. (1993). Grundrisse: Foundations for a critique of political economy. (Trans. Martin 
Nicolaus.) London: Penguin Books. 
McLennan, G. (2014). ‘On Stuart Hall’, Discover Society: 
http://www.discoversociety.org/2014/03/04/focus-on-stuart-hall/ 
McRobbie, A. (2000). Stuart Hall: The universities and the ‘hurly burly’. In P. Gilroy, L. Grossberg, &  
A. McRobbie (Eds.), Without guarantees: In honour of Stuart Hall, (pp. 212–224).  London: 
Verso.  
Poulantzas, N. (1973). Political power and social classes. London: New Left Books. 
Procter, J. (2004). Stuart Hall (Routledge Critical Thinkers Series). London: Routledge. 
Puwar, N. (2014). ‘Meeting Stuart Hall’s voice’, Open Democracy, 16 February 2014: 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/nirmal-puwar/meeting-stuart-hall’s-voice. 
Slack, J. (1996). The theory and method of articulation in cultural studies. In D. Morley, & K-H. Chen 
(Eds.), Stuart Hall: Critical dialogues in cultural studies (pp. ??-??). London: Routledge. 
Slack, J., & Wise J. (2007). Culture + technology: A primer. New York: Peter Lang. 
Thompson, E.P. (1978). The poverty of theory and other essays. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
